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Th is chapter deals with the right of communication to the public, the right of 
distribution, the right of public performance and the right of making available to 
the public. Th ese rights are all covered by the right relating to ‘openbaar maken’ 
(literally: ‘to make public’) in the Dutch Copyright Act. 
So-called ‘secondary’ communication to the public, notably cable redistribution, 
is dealt with separately and more extensively in Chapter 10 by Madeleine de 
Cock Buning. Th e concept of exhaustion, the most important limitation to the 
distribution right, is covered in detail in Chapter 11 by Feer Verkade. Openbaar 
maken is one of the two main categories of exclusive economic rights of the 
copyright owner in the Dutch Copyright Act. Th e other main category of restricted 
acts is ‘verveelvoudigen’, which includes both the right of reproduction and the 
right to make adaptations. Verveelvoudigen is analysed by Jaap Spoor in Chapter 8.
It is important to note that in Dutch copyright law there is no concept of indirect 
copyright infringement. However, many acts which in other jurisdictions are 
covered by indirect copyright infringement or by vicarious or secondary liability 
are in the Netherlands considered to be an ‘onrechtmatige daad’, an ‘unlawful act’ 
or tort within the general civil law tort provision, currently in Article 162 of Book 
6 of the Dutch Civil Code and previously developed in case law based on Article 
1401 of the old Civil Code: ‘An unlawful act shall be taken to mean an act or 
omission, violating a right or a statutory duty or violating either the good morals 
or the standard of due care, which must be observed in society with respect to 
a person or the person’s property (…)’.1 Within the context of this chapter it is 
important to realize that assisting in, facilitating, advertising or making a profi t 
* D.J.G. Visser is professor of intellectual property law at Leiden University and advocaat in Amsterdam
1 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 31 January 1919, NJ 1919, 161 (Lindenbaum v. Cohen).
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from copyright infringements can oft en amount to an ‘unfair act’. Th ese ‘unlawful 
acts’ connected to copyright infringements through communication to the public 
will be discussed in this chapter together with the form of communication with 
which they are connected. Otherwise, an incomplete picture would be given of 
this fi eld of copyright law.
2. Communication to the public
Communication to the public and the other acts covered by the right relating to 
‘openbaarmaking’ give rise to the same questions in all copyright systems. What 
kind of communication is involved? What constitutes ‘a public’? Which parties 
are liable for a particular kind of act of communication? 
2.1 Terminology
In this chapter the Dutch words ‘openbaar maken’, ‘openbaarmaking’ and 
‘openbaarmakingsrecht’ are not translated, because there is no English word or 
phrase that includes all diff erent acts covered by the openbaarmakingsrecht. Th e 
phrase ‘communication to the public’ is mainly used to indicate those forms of 
communication which are covered by Article 3 of the Information Society Directive, 
especially broadcasting and making available online. However, sometimes the 
phrase is used to also include the public performance right and the distribution 
right. Th e word ‘distribution’ is used to indicate the acts covered by Article 4 of the 
Information Society Directive: the right relating to the dissemination of physical 
copies, that is ‘fi xed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects’.2 Th e 
term ‘public performance’ is employed to designate acts of communication where 
the audience is present at the time and place where the performance takes place, 
including public recitation, public showing and public viewing. ‘Broadcasting’ is 
used to indicate the act of sending signals from point to multi-point, either through 
the air, through cable or by satellite. ‘Transmission’ is used to indicate the act 
of sending signals from point-to-point, sometimes described as ‘narrowcasting’. 
Finally, ‘making available (to the public)’ is used to indicate the act of making 
works available to the public ‘in such a way that members of the public may access 
them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them’, as described in 
Article 3 of the Information Society Directive.
2 Agreed statements concerning Articles 6 and 7 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty: ‘As used in these 
Articles, the expressions “copies” and “original and copies,” being subject to the right of distribution 
and the right of rental under the said Articles, refer exclusively to fi xed copies that can be put into 
circulation as tangible objects’.
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2.2 Distribution
Th e distribution of physical copies of a work is the oldest form of communication 
covered by copyright. In some copyright systems the right of distribution is 
closely linked to the right of reproduction: permission to make copies usually 
includes or implies the right to distribute those copies. Th e interests of owners 
of physical copies and those of commerce and trade do require some kind of 
exhaustion doctrine. Th e sale of second-hand copies should not be controlled by 
the author or the publisher. Exhaustion can also be limited territorially (nationally 
or regionally) and specifi c acts such as lending and rental can be excluded from 
its eff ect. Th e public lending or rental of copies is considered to be relevant under 
copyright and is usually covered by a separate exclusive right, as far as rental is 
concerned, or a right to an equitable remuneration, as far as lending is concerned. 
A central question with regard to exhaustion is when it commences: with the very 
fi rst transfer of ownership from the manufacturer to a trader or with the fi rst sale 
to a member of the public? Connected to this question is the question who is liable 
for the distribution of a copy? Th e manufacturer, the trader, the retailer or even a 
member of the public selling an illegal copy? And there is the question regarding 
‘the public’. What constitutes a public to which the distribution takes place? Does 
the sending of one copy to a friend constitute distribution to the public?
2.3 Performance
Another even older form of communication is recitation or performance. Th e fi rst 
question is whether there is a public performance. How large does the public have 
to be? Does there need to be an admission fee for a performance to be considered 
public? Is it enough if the performance is open to the public, without an actual 
audience present? Does the nature or aim of the performance play a role? Does 
the music played at a private funeral, to which only some family, friends and 
neighbours are invited, constitute a public performance? Who is liable for the 
public performance? Is it (only) the performer himself? Or is it the organizer of 
the performance? Or maybe the owner of the venue where the performance takes 
place too?
2.4 Broadcasting
New forms of communication create new questions regarding the right of 
communication to the public. Broadcasting was quickly recognized as a new 
form of communication to the public in all copyright systems, because it typically 
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reaches a larger audience which does constitute a public. But who is liable for the 
broadcast? Is it the organization that creates the programme or is it the entity 
that actually causes the programme to go on air? Or are they both liable? And 
what constitutes a separate broadcast? Does every rebroadcast that takes place 
later in time count? Or is simultaneous rebroadcasting also covered? Satellite 
broadcasting and encrypted signals introduced new questions. Is the satellite 
uplink a communication to the public? Or is the satellite downlink in every 
separate country a separate communication to the public? Is the broadcasting of 
an encrypted signal a communication to the public? Or is the making available 
of decryption tools (information, apparatus or both) an act relevant under 
copyright? 
2.5 Making available online
Th e making available of works over the Internet is probably the most far-reaching 
communication to the public. But which acts exactly give rise to liability under 
copyright? Is uploading an act relevant under copyright? Does the making 
available and/or maintenance of a bulletin board, online discussion forum, 
online marketplace, or dedicated search engine amount to a communication to 
the public? What about hyperlinking and embedding?
3. Communication to the public in the Dutch Copyright Act
3.1 Legislative history
Th e previous Dutch Copyright Act of 1881 contained a right of public performance 
only in relation to plays and musical-dramatic works.3 In the 1912 Act, the rights 
relating to public performance (including public recitation) and other kinds 
of communication to the public in Articles 11(1) and (3), 13 and 14 of the 1908 
version of the Berne Convention were to be enacted. Th e openbaarmakingsrecht 
would apply to all kinds of works then protected: literary works, musical works, 
plays, dramatico-musical works, fi lms, but also ‘tableaux vivants’ of paintings, 
‘living statues’ (people taking poses representing statues), and projections with 
‘magic lanterns’ of images of works of art. Th e Dutch legislator chose in 1912 
to bring all these kinds of exploitation of a work directed at ‘a public’ under a 
very broad concept of openbaar maken. Th ere is no indication that the Dutch 
legislator at the time had the specifi c ‘grand design’ of anticipating any future 
3 See M. Reinsma, Auteurswet 1881, Walburg: Pers Zutphen 2006, p. 16-17.
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kinds of communication to the public. Apparently, it just so happened that the 
legislator chose to bring distribution to the public and public performance under 
the umbrella of one concept called ‘making public’ (openbaar maken).
3.2 Th e Act of 1912 and subsequent amendments
Broadly speaking, openbaar maken includes the right of fi rst publication, the 
right to communicate to the public, the right of public performance and the right 
of distribution. In the Dutch Copyright Act, the right relating to openbaar maken 
is codifi ed in Article 1 and Article 12. Article 1 has never been changed and has 
retained its exact same wording since 1912:
Auteursrecht [copyright] is the exclusive right of the maker of a literary, scientifi c or 
artistic work or his successors in title to ‘openbaar maken’ [make the work public] and 
to ‘verveelvoudigen’ [reproduce/adapt it], subject to the limitations laid down by law.
Article 12 remained unchanged from 1912 to 1972. From 1983 to 2011 it was amended 
more than ten times. Th e original 1912 version of Article 12 (then numbered 11) 
reads as follows:4
Th e communication to the public of a literary, scientifi c or artistic work also includes: 
(i)   the openbaarmaking of a verveelvoudiging [reproduction or adaptation] of all 
or part of the work; 
(ii)   the distribution of all or part of a work or of a reproduction thereof, so long as 
such work has not appeared in print; 
(iii)  the public recitation, performance or presentation of all or part of a work or of 
a reproduction thereof. 
A recitation, performance or presentation in a private circle shall be deemed to be a 
public recitation if there is a charge for admission in any form, including payment of 
a subscription fee or any kind of membership fee. Th is provision shall apply also to 
an exhibition.
4 Th is original 1912 version of Article 12 is still in force in the Auteurswet (BES) of 2010, the regulation 
of copyright for the Dutch Caribbean islands Bonaire, Saint-Eustace and Saint-Martin which 
administratively became part of the kingdom in Europe in 2010, when the larger islands became 
independent states within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
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Th e 1912 defi nition of public performance was based on the defi nition of the same 
in Article 1(2) of the 1881 Act, which read as follows: 
A public performance shall include any performance which is accessible once or 
several times, against payment, even if there also is a ballot to gain access.
A proposal to add the phrase ‘unless the performance takes place within the 
private home circle’ was rejected as unnecessary, because the present defi nition 
already excluded such performance from the concept of public performance.
In 1972 the defi nition of the private circle was amended to its present form 
(see below) and two new subparagraphs were added. One new subparagraph 
implemented Article 11bis of the Berne Convention relating to simultaneous 
rebroadcasting by the same organism. Th e new subparagraph on simultaneous 
rebroadcasting by the same organism lead to much parliamentary debate in 1972 
on the position of Central Antenna Systems, the predecessor of current cable 
redistribution. 
Th e other new subparagraph introduced in 1972 excluded from the 
openbaarmakingsrecht public recitations and performances which are part 
of non-profi t public education. Th e defi nition of this kind of non-profi t public 
education was changed slightly several times during the following years.
In 1995 the lending and the rental right were added on the basis of the Rental 
Right Directive (Staatsblad 1995, 653). In 1996, the Satellite and Cable Directive 
was implemented by the addition of Article 12(1)(5) and Article 12(7) (Staatsblad 
1996, 364).
In 2004 the Information Society Directive was implemented by introducing for 
the fi rst time a specifi c clause on exhaustion in the form of Article 12b (Staatsblad 
2004, 336). Interestingly, ‘the making available’ right of Article 3(1) of the 
Directive was not implemented by any amendment of the Copyright Act, because 
the legislator felt that it was clear that this kind of communication to the public 
was already covered by the existing broad right relating to openbaarmaking.
3.3 Structure of Article 12
Openbaar maken is mentioned in Article 1 and the main subcategories of 
openbaar maken are described in Article 12.
What is meant primarily by ‘openbaar maken’, which is one of the essential 
prerogatives of copyright, does not have to be determined in the law. For every kind 
of literary, scientifi c or artistic work the word clearly has its natural meaning. For 
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literary and scientifi c works, which consist of writings, it means: to make appear in 
print and make available to the public, to publish. Th e same applies to musical works. 
With paintings and sculptures it means: to send in to an exhibition, to make available 
to the public. With works of applied art it means: to put on the market. But apart from 
this primary meaning, the codifi cation of copyright requires that another meaning 
[of openbaar maken] be specifi ed, which is not so self-evident that is does not require 
explanation in the law. (Explanatory Memorandum of 1912)
Th erefore, some meanings of openbaar maken are not mentioned in Article 12. 
In the fi rst sentence of Article 12 it is stated that openbaar maken ‘also includes’ 
the categories listed in Article 12. Th e main meaning of openbaar maken must be 
derived from the ‘natural meaning’ per category of works and from the fact that 
openbaar maken is mentioned in Article 1.
It is apparent from the legislative history of the Copyright Act 1912 that the concept 
‘openbaarmaking’ in article 12, does indeed have a very broad meaning, but that 
in any case, also in the derivative meanings of the concept, the work must become 
available to the public in one way or another.5 
What is meant by ‘(the) public’ is one of the key issues of openbaar maken. However, 
what is meant exactly by ‘public’ is not necessarily the same for all categories of 
openbaar maken. Th erefore the question of what is ‘public’ within the meaning of 
the diff erent kinds of openbaarmaking will be discussed separately for each kind 
of openbaarmaking. 
Th e fi rst part of Article 12 probably, at least initially, had to be understood as 
a scope rule, not so much referring to a particular kind of openbaar maken, but 
referring to the scope of protection of the exploitation right.
Openbaar maken of a literary, scientifi c or artistic work also includes:
1°.openbaar maken of a verveelvoudiging of the whole or part of a work;
Here verveelvoudiging also has the meaning of adaptation.
On the one hand, one cannot deny that the openbaar maken in the form of a somewhat 
diff erent imitation [adaptation] of a sculptural work, - a photograph of, for instance, a 
marble sculpture -, is not openbaar maken of the work [itself] in the literal sense. But 
on the other hand, it must be admitted that the maker of the work has just as much 
5 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 27 January 1995, NJ 1995, 669 (Bigott v. Doucal).
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right to decide on the publication of verveelvoudigingen [here: copies in adapted 
form] of his creation as of the work itself; that by publication of reproductions of his 
work without his permission, his rights are violated. (Explanatory Memorandum of 
1912)
One distinction that is sometimes made between two diff erent categories of 
openbaar maken, is between ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ openbaar maken. 
‘Material’ openbaar maken is the distribution of hard copies, hence the word 
material. ‘Immaterial’ openbaar maken is communication to a public not 
involving the distribution of hard copies.
Th e diff erent categories of openbaar maken will be discussed here in the 
following order:
•  Th e right to make the work (available to the) public for the fi rst time 
(fi rst publication);
•  Th e ‘verbreidingsrecht’: the right to make a few copies of the work 
available to a small number of people before the work appears in print;
• ‘Material’ openbaar maken: the distribution right;
•  ‘Immaterial’ openbaar maken: the right to communicate to the public, 
including the right of public performance, the broadcasting right and 
the right of making available.
3.4 Th e right to make the work (available to the) public for the fi rst time
Within the system of the 1912 Act, the right to make the work (available to the) 
public for the fi rst time, is classifi ed as an exploitation right. It is comparable 
to the ‘Veröff enlichungsrecht’ and the ‘droit de divulgation’ and the ‘droit the 
publication’, in Germany and France respectively, which are moral rights. 
Th is meaning of openbaar maken does not refer to a specifi c act such as 
distribution of copies, public performance or any other kind of communication 
to the public. It just refers to the fact that the work is made available to the public 
for the fi rst time, regardless through which kind of communication.
Th is right gives the maker or his successor in title the right to determine 
whether and when his work is made available to the public for the fi rst time. It is 
considered an essential prerogative of an author to have the right and the freedom 
to determine whether or not he wants to make his work available to the public at 
all, and if so, when he wants to do that. It concerns the transformation from the 
phase intime of the author to the phase public. 
Works that have not (yet) been made available to the public for the fi rst time 
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enjoy special protection. For instance, they cannot be the subject of a seizure by 
creditors6 and several statutory limitations, such as the quotation right7 and the 
right to educational copying,8 do not apply. 
What is meant by ‘public’ with regard to this particular kind of openbaar 
maken is not very clear. In a case regarding a particular document of the Church 
of Scientology, the district court9 considered this document, of which copies had 
been made available to 2500 followers of the Church of Scientology, to have been 
made available to the public and therefore ruled that the quotation rights did 
apply. Th e Court of Appeal10 ruled that the work had not been made available to the 
public, because it was made available to those 2500 people under a confi dentiality 
clause. Th e fact that this confi dentiality clause had been violated was irrelevant 
in this respect. Th erefore, the Court of Appeal ruled that the statutory quotation 
right did not apply, but also that quotation was allowed on the basis of the freedom 
of information as a fundamental right.
3.5 Th e ‘verbreidingsrecht’ (distribution in a small circle)
Th e ‘verbreidingsrecht’ is the right relating to ‘the distribution of the whole or 
part of a work or of a repro duction thereof, as long as the work has not appeared 
in print’ (Article 12(1)(2)).
Th is is in fact the right to make a few copies of the work available to a small 
number of people before the work appears in print, without making it available 
to the public at large, and therefore without giving it the status of a work made 
available to the public (at large) for the fi rst time.
Th e very limited meaning of the ‘public’ within this category of openbaar 
maken, follows from the word ‘verbreiding’ and the Explanatory Memorandum 
of 1912. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the author must have the 
right ‘to give or make available his work to a certain [limited] number of people 
not large enough to be considered synonymous to openbaar maken’. 
Th is kind of openbaar maken is therefore a bit of a contradiction in terms: it 
is openbaar maken which does not amount to openbaar maken. What is meant 
is that the author has the right to make a very limited number copies available to 
a very limited number of people, for instance for the purpose of pre-publication 




9 District Court of Th e Hague, 9 June 1999 (Scientology).
10 Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, 4 September 2003 (Scientology).
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making it appear in print. Obviously, in 1912 there was a clear distinction between 
distributing a few handwritten or typed copies to a few people and distributing 
printed copies to the public at large. In 2012, the criterion ‘as long as the work has 
not appeared in print’ is an anachronism.11
What the ‘verbreidingsrecht’ does make clear however, is that not every 
distribution of a small number of copies or small scale performance amounts to 
the work being made available for the fi rst time within the meaning described 
above. And this does remain very relevant in today’s world: some kinds of 
communication to a very limited ‘public’ can and should remain confi dential. 
3.6 Th e distribution right
Th e distribution right can be surmised from the fi rst subparagraph of Article 12:
Openbaar maken of a literary, scientifi c or artistic work also includes:
1°.openbaar maken of a verveelvoudiging of the whole or part of a work
As verveelvoudiging also means (exact) reproduction or copy (as opposed to 
adaptation), this section of the law can be read as the right to openbaar maken 
[make public] a copy (or reproduction) of the whole or part of a work. As described 
above, this provision was included as a scope rule, rather than a rule pointing to 
the existence of a distribution right.
Th e distribution right however is probably one of the ‘natural meanings’ of 
openbaar maken which according to the legislator in 1912 did not require to be 
mentioned separately in Article 12, and follows from the word ‘openbaar maken’ 
itself as mentioned in Article 1 and in Article 12(1)(1).
Th erefore, until quite recently, in fact until the implementation of the 
European Information Society Directive, the distribution right, including its 
most important limitation, namely exhaustion (in Dutch: ‘uitputting’), was not 
dealt with separately in the Dutch Copyright Act at all. It all had to be surmised 
from the natural meaning of openbaar maken as mentioned in Article 1.
Th e distribution right as a distinct right, separate from the right to make available 
for the fi rst time described above and separate from the verveelvoudigingsrecht, 
was recognized by the Supreme Court for the fi rst time in 1953. In the Polak v. De 
Muinck case,12 the Supreme Court ruled that the distribution of separate copies of 
11 As is the old-fashioned spelling of this defi nition in Dutch ‘zoolang het niet in druk verschenen is’. In 
modern Dutch ‘zoolang’ (as long as), is spelled with one ‘o’ (‘zolang’). 
12 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 18 December 1953, NJ 1954, 258 (Polak v. de Muinck).
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a work requires the permission of the owner of the copyright. De Muinck was the 
owner of the copyright in some art reproductions. Polak came into possession of 
one of these reproductions (it is unclear how) and sold it. Polak argued that this 
was not openbaar maken, as De Muinck had already sold copies of the same work 
and that therefore the right was exhausted.
Th e Supreme Court dismissed this reasoning and ruled: 
that however the exclusive right to openbaarmaking of the work comprises not just, 
and therefore is not exhausted by, the openbaarmaking of one or more copies of 
that work, but, as is also apparent from Article 12 sub 1 of the Copyright Act – the 
copyright owner, and he alone, has the right openbaar te maken in respect to any 
verveelvoudiging [reproduction];
that therefore the copies which have been brought into circulation without his 
permission shall be deemed to be openbaar gemaakt in violation of his copyright.
For the distribution right to apply, one or more copies of the work need to have 
been handed to or sent to a member of the public; someone outside a restricted 
circle. As long as distribution takes place intentionally within a restricted circle, 
the verbreidingsrecht does apply (see above), but there is no making available to 
the public for the fi rst time, nor is there exhaustion. Th e intention of the rights 
owner probably does play a role: if he intended to make the work available to just a 
few friends or colleagues the verbreidingsrecht applies, but the distribution right 
does not. 
In a case regarding the presence in transit of a shipment of closed containers 
with cigarettes in the harbour of Aruba13 destined for sale in other parts of the 
world, the Supreme Court ruled that the distribution right did not apply:
It is apparent from the legislative history of the Auteurswet 1912 that the concept 
‘openbaarmaking’ in Article 12, does indeed have a very broad meaning, but that 
in any case, also in the derivative meanings of the concept, the work must become 
available to the public in one way or another.14
13 Aruba, as a separate entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (since 1986), has its separate 
Auteursverordening, which does include a right relating to openbaar maken, which is identical to the 
concept in the Dutch Copyright Act. Th e Supreme Court of the Netherlands is also the Supreme Court 
for Aruba. Th ere is no doubt that this decision also applies in ‘the Kingdom in Europe’. 
14 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 27 January 1995, NJ 1995, 669 (Bigott v. Doucal).
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Th is however does not imply that in order for the distribution right to apply the 
product must have reached a public of end users. Th e distribution right applies, 
and is indeed exhausted, as soon as the copies in question have been sold, for 
instance to a wholesaler, in the territory where the Copyright Act applies.
Obviously, since the implementation of the Information Society Directive in 
2004 the scope of the distribution right is determined by Article 4 of that directive. 
In 2004, the principle of exhaustion of the distribution right was codifi ed for 
the fi rst time in Article 12b. In 1952 and in 1987 the principle of exhaustion had 
been recognized and confi rmed by the Supreme Court in the Leesportfeuille15 and 
Stemra v. Free Record Shop16 cases.
Th e concept of exhaustion and the history thereof is dealt with in much 
more detail in Chapter 11 by Feer Verkade. Th e relevant case law, including the 
important Leesportfeuille, Stemra v. Free Record Shop and Poortvliet cases, is also 
discussed by Verkade in his chapter dedicated to exhaustion.
3.7 Public performance
As mentioned above, ‘immaterial’ openbaar maken covers the right to communicate 
to the public, including the right of public performance. It covers the rights of 
public performance mentioned in Articles 11(1)(i), 11bis(1)(i) and 14(1)(ii) of the 
Berne Convention and of public recitation mentioned in Article 11ter(1)(i) of the 
Convention. It also covers any communication to the public (of performances or 
recitations) by loudspeaker or otherwise as mentioned in Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)
(ii) and (iii), 11ter(1)(i) and (ii) and 14(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention.
Recitation, playing, performance or presentation in public is mentioned in 
Article 12(1)(4) DCA. Th is public performance part of openbaar maken also 
includes the so-called secondary public performance which takes place when 
a radio is played in a public place. Th e Dutch cause célèbre in this respect 
concerned the broadcast of a performance of Th e Czarevitch by Franz Léhar by 
the Dutch Broadcasting Organization, which was played by a Mr Vergeer to the 
customers of his café in Rotterdam on 11 September 1935. In its Caféradio decision 
of 1938,17 the Supreme Court ruled that the playing of a radio in a café amounts to 
a separate openbaarmaking, notwithstanding the fact that the (live) performance 
in the radio studio or concert hall and the broadcasting also amount to an 
openbaarmaking. 
15 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 25 January 1952, NJ 1952, 95 (Leesportefeuille).
16 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 November 1987, NJ 1988, 280 (Stemra v. Free Record Shop).
17 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 6 May 1938, NJ 1938, 635 (Caféradio).
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Th e defi nition of what is ‘public’ with respect to these kinds of openbaar 
maken is given somewhat indirectly in the current Article 12(4):
Th e expression ‘recitation, playing, performance or presentation in public’ includes 
that in a closed circle, except where this is limited to relatives or friends or equivalent 
persons and no form of payment whatsoever is made for admission to the recitati on, 
play, performance or presentation. Th e same applies to exhibitions.
Th erefore, the defi nition of ‘public’ is any communication directed at an audience 
outside or larger than a circle of ‘relatives or friends or equivalent persons’.
A circle of ‘equivalent persons’ was defi ned by the Supreme Court as ‘a group 
of persons with personal ties almost as tight as family ties or ties of friendship’. 
Th e inhabitants of a retirement home, the Willem Dreeshuis, were not considered 
to form such a group, and the playing of music in the communal rooms of the 
retirement home was considered a public performance by the Supreme Court.18 
Likewise, the attendees of a funeral ceremony were not considered to form such 
a close-knit group and there the playing of music was also considered a public 
performance.19 However, the Supreme Court also ruled that performing rights 
collecting society Buma was allowed not to collect for the playing of music during 
funeral ceremonies for policy reasons. Mr Hille, composer of the funeral favourite 
Waarheen, waarvoor (Whereto, wherefore), was not able to force Buma to collect 
at funerals on his behalf.
If music is being played in a place of business by the owner or employer, for 
the benefi t of the employees or customers, this will usually amount to a public 
performance. If an employee plays music for his own pleasure only, this does not 
necessarily amount to a public performance. Th is was decided in a case regarding 
the playing of a radio by an employee of a laundry (Wasserij De Zon [Laundry 
Th e Sun]):20
When someone plays music only for his own pleasure, the mere fact that other people 
can also hear the music can only amount to an openbaarmaking within the sense of 
the Auteurswet 1912, if he has a professional or business interest in the fact that others 
besides himself can listen to the music. 
18 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 9 March 1979, NJ 1979, 341 (Willem Dreeshuis).
19 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 6 March 1998, NJ 1999, 113 (Hille v. Buma).
20 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 1 June 1979, NJ 1979, 470 (Wasserij De Zon).
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Liability for public performance 
In case of a live performance, the performers themselves are primarily liable 
under copyright for their public performance.21 With mechanical music or fi lm it 
is the person or legal entity which controls the playing or showing to take place 
who is liable for the openbaarmaking. Th e organizer of a live performance or the 
owner of the venue where a performance takes place is not considered to be liable 
for the public performance on the basis of copyright law.22 Th ey will however be 
liable on the basis of tort law. Th ey will commit an ‘unfair act’ if they have not 
checked whether the relevant rights for the public performance have been cleared 
with the right owners.23
Public performance for educational purposes
According to Article 12(5) DCA ‘recitation, playing, performance or presentation 
in public’ does not include those that take place exclusively for the purposes of 
education provided on behalf of the public authorities or a non-profi t-making 
legal person, in so far as such a recitation, playing, performance or presentation 
forms part of the school work plan or curriculum where applicable, or those that 
exclusively serve a scientifi c purpose. Th is clause, which is in fact a limitation 
internalized in the paragraph dealing with the exclusive right, has over time 
changed slightly in wording but not in substance. It clearly exempts all non-profi t 
classroom use. It probably does not apply to distance learning or any kind of 
making available at a distance. Th ose kinds of educational use are covered by the 
limitation on copyright laid down in Article 16 of the DCA, which is subject to the 
payment of fair compensation.
3.8 Broadcasting
Broadcasting was not mentioned in the original 1912 version of the Auteurswet, 
because the technology did not exist at that time, at least not on a commercial 
scale, but there was never any doubt that broadcasting was covered by the broad 
openbaarmakingsrecht.24 It includes the broadcasting and the rebroadcasting 
rights mentioned in Article 11bis(1)(i) and (ii) of the Berne Convention.
21 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 4 June 1920, NJ 1920, 720: singer and accompanying piano are jointly 
liable for the public performance on the basis of copyright.
22 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 11 June 1920, NJ 1920, 718 (Buitensociëteit) and Supreme Court of 
the Netherlands, 11 February 1926, NJ 1920, 354 (Harmonie Phileutonia).
23 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 8 March 1957, NJ 1957, 271 (Buma v. De Vries).
24 Possibly the earliest decision on broadcasting and copyright in the Netherlands: Sub-District Court 
Hilversum, 27 September 1927, NJ 1927, 1885.
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In 1931 Article 17bis25 was introduced creating the possibility to regulate by 
royal decree the right regarding the openbaarmaking by radio diff usion. Th is 
followed the introduction of Article 11bis in the Berne Convention at the Rome 
Revision of 1928. It was felt that broadcasting did not have to be mentioned in 
Article 12. In 1938 the Supreme Court confi rmed that radio broadcasting was 
indeed a form of openbaarmaking.26
Article 12(1)(5) contains a reference to ‘the broadcasting of a work 
incorporated in a radio or television programme, by satellite or other transmitter 
or a broadcasting network’, followed by a reference to the most recent 
Telecommunications or Media Act (currently the Media Act 2008). Th is reference 
however has no eff ect on the applicability of the openbaarmakingsrecht to other 
possible forms of broadcasting.
(Cable) redistribution
In 1930, the Supreme Court ruled in its Radiocentrale decision27 that redistribution 
of a radiobroadcast did not amount to a separate openbaarmaking, but in 1958 
the Supreme Court decided in its Draadomroep decision28 that a kind of cable 
redistribution of a radiobroadcast did amount to a separate openbaarmaking. 
Th is has also been laid down in Article 12(7). In the 1980s the Supreme Court 
rendered its famous Amstelveen cable decisions,29 in which it ruled that secondary 
cable redistribution, also within the reception area of the original terrestrial 
broadcasting of the same programme, is a new openbaarmaking. Th ese decisions 
and secondary (cable) redistribution in general are dealt with in much more 
detail in Chapter 10 by Madeleine de Cock Buning.
‘Cable pirates’
Th ere is one decision on ‘involuntary’ cable-casting which is important to note, 
because it could serve as a precedent for the liability of Internet intermediaries 
such as Internet service providers, hosting providers and others. In 1980 ‘cable 
pirates’ used rather weak close-range transmitters, which were hard to detect, 
to transmit broadcasts of pirated movies directly into the reception system (the 
dish) of the Amsterdam cable distributor KTA. Th ey did this aft er midnight, aft er 
the regular broadcasting hours of KTA. Th e signal transmitted by the ‘pirates’ was 
25 Th is article was abolished in 1972.
26 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 4 March 1938, NJ 1939, 948 (Buma v. Broadcasting organizations).
27 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 3 April 1930, NJ 1931, p. 53 (Radiocentrale).
28 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 27 June 1958, NJ 1958, 405 (Draadomroep).
29 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 30 October 1981, NJ 1982, 435 and 25 May 1984, NJ 1984, 697 
(Amstelveens Kabel I + II).
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broadcast involuntarily by KTA to all its 300 000 subscribers, because the KTA 
cable network was not switched off . Th e courts, including the Dutch Supreme 
Court, ruled that KTA was liable for direct copyright infringement because its 
involvement, keeping its systems switched on during the night, was covered by 
the broad concept of the openbaarmakingsrecht.30
3.9 Th e concept of ‘public’ under pre-harmonized Dutch copyright law
 
Before looking into the infl uence of European copyright law, it might be useful to 
establish whether or not there was one concept of ‘public’ that applied in the same 
way to all kinds of openbaar maken under pre-harmonized Dutch copyright law. 
Th at is however not quite clear.
Before the advent of the digital networked environment, the issues relating to 
the distribution of physical copies, broadcasting and (re)broadcasting and public 
performance could be separated quite easily in practice and posed in fact mostly 
distinct problems. 
As regards traditional distribution, the question what is public and what is not 
usually only arises in the context of exhaustion or cross-border trade. Small-scale 
distribution is usually covered by the ‘verbeidingsrecht’ and/or involves illegal 
copies, which can be challenged with the reproduction right. In a case on cross-
border trade in the harbour of Aruba, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that in 
general ‘the work must become available to the public in one way or another’.31 But 
it is questionable whether this is in fact a tenable position outside the particular 
case involved, if a public of end users is meant. Usually, the distribution right is 
exhausted long before the copies reach the end user. It is the fi rst sale that triggers 
exhaustion, not the actual availability to the end user.32
In the case of broadcasting, the question oft en was whether some acts of 
rebroadcasting of signals received by central antenna or dish, by professional 
middlemen or by local government owners of apartment blocks amounted to a 
new communication to the public. Th ese issues were oft en addressed on the basis 
of the ‘autre organisme’ concept in the Berne Convention. If that happens, the size 
or nature of ‘the public’ is oft en not taken into consideration as such. In relation 
to the small cable networks, the Dutch Supreme Court decided that with cable 
redistribution the same ‘circle of family and friends’- criterion for ‘public’ should be 
applied as for public performance, because no other clear and acceptable criterion 
30 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 14 January 1984, NJ 1984, 696 (‘Cable pirates’).
31 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 27 January 1995, NJ 1995, 669 (Bigott v. Doucal).
32 Compare: Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, 31 May 2011, LJN BQ6773, IEF 9740 (Hauck v. Stokke).
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was available.33 It is important to note that the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that with 
regard to cable redistribution there was no requirement of reaching a ‘new public’,34 
as is discussed in Chapter 10 by Madeleine de Cock Buning. Th e intervention of 
an ‘autre organisme’ suffi  ced. Th is is interesting, because the European Court of 
Justice seems to favour an approach based on a concept of a ‘new public’, which can 
indeed be reached through ‘intervention by other operators’.
With public performance the question usually is whether a small-scale 
performance for a limited audience does or does not require a licence form the 
musical performance right collecting society. Th ese issues were settled in the 
Netherlands in 1979 in the Willem Dreeshuis35 and Wasserij De Zon (Laundry Th e 
Sun)36 cases discussed above.
Whether or not this actually amounted to a general concept of ‘public’ in theory 
or in practice is debatable and was subject to diff erent opinions. Some argued that 
there was not or should not be a general concept of ‘public’ in Dutch copyright,37 
while others argued that there was or should be.38 Th e latter position was however 
already infl uenced by the advent of the digital networked environment.
4. European context and current global context
4.1 What is harmonized and what is not? 
Many of the rights covered by the openbaarmakingsrecht are now harmonized by 
European law, but not all of them. European law must in turn be interpreted in 
line with the Berne Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
Th e secondary cable distribution and satellite broadcasting rights are 
harmonized by the Satellite and Cable Directive and by Article 3 of the Information 
Society Directive. Th e right relating to communication to the public and making 
available to the public online is harmonized by Article 3 of the Information Society 
Directive. Th e distribution right is harmonized by Article 4 of the Information 
Society Directive. Th e rental and lending rights are harmonized by the Rental 
Right Directive. Th e right relating to public performance is not harmonized by 
any European directive, but it is covered by Articles 11, 11bis, 11ter and 14 of the 
Berne Convention. 
33 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 24 December 1993, NJ 1994, 641 (Small Cable Network), at 3.7.
34 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 30 October 1981, NJ 1982, 435 and 25 May 1984, NJ 1984, 697 
(Amstelveens Kabel I + II).
35 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 9 March 1979, NJ 1979, 341 (Willem Dreeshuis).
36 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 1 June 1979, NJ 1979, 470 (Wasserij De Zon).
37 P.B. Hugenholtz, Auteursrecht en Information Retrieval, Deventer 1982, p. 47.
38 D.J.G. Visser, Auteursrecht op toegang, Den Haag 1997, p. 132-135.
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Articles 3 and 4 Information Society Directive are currently most important 
for the interpretation of the rights covered by the openbaarmakingsrecht and are 
therefore cited in full. Article 3(1) Information Society Directive, which is in turn 
based on Article 8 WCT,39 reads as follows:
Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit 
any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including 
the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the 
public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
Recital 23 of the Information Society Directive seems to limit this right of 
communication to the public to ‘transmissions’ where the public is not present at 
the place where the communication originates:
Th is Directive should harmonise further the author’s right of communication to the 
public. Th is right should be understood in a broad sense covering all communication 
to the public not present at the place where the communication originates. Th is right 
should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire 
or wireless means, including broadcasting. Th is right should not cover any other acts.
In its Premier League decision40 the European Court of Justice stated: 
201 In this regard, it is apparent from Common Position No 48/2000 that this recital 
follows from the proposal of the European Parliament, which wished to specify, in 
the recital, that communication to the public within the meaning of that directive 
does not cover ‘direct representation or performance’, a concept referring to that 
of ‘public performance’ which appears in Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention and 
encompasses interpretation of the works before the public that is in direct physical 
contact with the actor or performer of those works (see the Guide to the Berne 
Convention, an interpretative document drawn up by WIPO which, without being 
39 Article 8 WCT Right of Communication to the Public:
 ‘Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 
14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the 
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these 
works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
 Agreed statements concerning Article 8: It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for 
enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning 
of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that nothing in Article 8 precludes a 
Contracting Party from applying Article 11bis (2).’
40 CJEU, 4 October 2011, C-403/08 and C-429/08 (Premier League).
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binding, nevertheless assists in interpreting that convention, as the Court observed 
in SGAE, paragraph 41). 
202 Th us, in order to exclude such direct public representation and performance 
from the scope of the concept of communication to the public in the context of the 
Copyright Directive, recital 23 in its preamble explained that communication to the 
public covers all communication to the public not present at the place where the 
communication originates. 
203 Such an element of direct physical contact is specifi cally absent in the case of 
transmission, in a place such as a public house, of a broadcast work via a television 
screen and speakers to the public which is present at the place of that transmission, 
but which is not present at the place where the communication originates within the 
meaning of recital 23 in the preamble to the Copyright Directive, that is to say, at 
the place of the representation or performance which is broadcast (see, to this eff ect, 
SGAE, paragraph 40). 
Th e requirement of ‘direct physical contact with the actor or performer of 
those works’ might well suggest that the playing and viewing of a recording of a 
performance, for instance including the viewing of a movie, is also not excluded 
from the harmonized concept of communication to the public. Th is might 
mean that only the live performance is not covered by the harmonized concept 
of communication to the public. Th is view might be supported by the broad 
meaning of ‘transmission’ mentioned below.
Th e fact that live performance is not covered by the harmonized concept of 
communication to the public was confi rmed by the European Court of Justice in 
its Circul Globus Bucureşti decision of 24 November 2011.41
What is meant by ‘transmission’?
In the same Premier League decision the European Court of Justice also stated 
that 
195 […], the proprietor of a public house intentionally gives the customers present in 
that establishment access to a broadcast containing protected works via a television 
screen and speakers. Without his intervention the customers cannot enjoy the works 
broadcast, even though they are physically within the broadcast’s catchment area. 
Th us, the circumstances of such an act prove comparable to those in SGAE. 
41 CJEU, 24 November 2011, C-283/10 (Circul Globus Bucureşti).
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196 Accordingly, it must be held that the proprietor of a public house eff ects a 
communication when he intentionally transmits broadcast works, via a television 
screen and speakers, to the customers present in that establishment [emphasis added].
Apparently, the act of giving ‘the customers present in that establishment access 
to a broadcast containing protected works via a television screen and speakers’ 
can also be qualifi ed as ‘transmission’. 
Recital 25 of the Information Society Directive makes clear that ‘the making 
available right’ refers to ‘interactive on-demand transmissions’: 
It should be made clear that all right holders recognised by this Directive should 
have an exclusive right to make available to the public copyright works or any other 
subject-matter by way of interactive on-demand transmissions. Such interactive on-
demand transmissions are characterised by the fact that members of the public may 
access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
Article 4 Information Society Directive, which is in turn based on Article 6 
WCT,42 reads as follows:
1.  Member States shall provide for authors, in respect of the original of their works 
or of copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any form of 
distribution to the public by sale or otherwise.
2.  Th e distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of 
the original or copies of the work, except where the fi rst sale or other transfer of 
ownership in the Community of that object is made by the right holder or with his 
consent.
42 Article 6 WCT Righ t of Distribution:
 ‘(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making 
available to the public of the original and copies of their works through sale or other transfer of 
ownership.
  (2) Nothing in this Treaty shall aff ect the freedom of Contracting Parties to determine the conditions, if 
any, under which the exhaustion of the right in paragraph (1) applies aft er the fi rst sale or other transfer 
of ownership of the original or a copy of the work with the authorization of the author. 
 Agreed statements concerning Articles 6 and 7: As used in these Articles, the expressions “copies” and 
“original and copies,” being subject to the right of distribution and the right of rental under the said 
Articles, refer exclusively to fi xed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects.’
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4.2 What is ‘the public’?
Communication to the public
In 2000 the European Court of Justice took the position that the concept of ‘the 
public’ is not harmonized by the Satellite and Cable Directive: 
 
Th e question whether the reception by a hotel establishment of satellite or terrestrial 
television signals and their distribution by cable to the various rooms of that hotel is an ‘act 
of communication to the public’ or ‘reception by the public’ is not governed by [the Satellite 
and Cable Directive], and must consequently be decided in accordance with national 
law.43 
In June 2005 the European Court of Justice ruled in Mediakabel on the defi nition 
of ‘television broadcasting’ in another European directive, which is not a directive 
relating to copyright but to regulatory aspects of television broadcasting services. 
Th e Court ruled: 
A service comes within the concept of ‘television broadcasting’ referred to in Article 
1(a) of Directive 89/552, as amended by Directive 97/36, if it consists of the initial 
transmission of television programmes intended for reception by the public, that is, 
an indeterminate number of potential television viewers, to whom the same images 
are transmitted simultaneously. Th e manner in which the images are transmitted is 
not a determining element in that assessment.44
In this context the Court defi ned ‘the public’ as ‘an indeterminate number of 
potential television viewers’. One month later, in July 2005, in Lagardère the 
European Court of Justice repeated this defi nition of ‘the public’ in a decision on 
the interpretation of the Satellite and Cable Directive:
Finally, it must be observed that a limited circle of persons who can receive the signals 
from the satellite only if they use professional equipment cannot be regarded as part 
of the public, given that the latter must be made up of an indeterminate number 
of potential listeners (see, regarding the meaning of the term public, Case C-89/04 
Mediakabel […], paragraph 30).45
43 ECJ, 3 February 2000, C-293/98 (Egeda v. Hoasa).
44 ECJ, 5 June 2005, C-89/04 (Mediakabel)
45 ECJ, 14 July 2055, C-192/04 (Lagardère), paragraph 30. 
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Here, the defi nition of ‘the public’ was no longer to be ‘decided in accordance 
with national law’ and was for the fi rst time in the context of a copyright directive 
given as ‘an indeterminate number of potential listeners’. 
In December 2006 in SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles the European Court of Justice 
ruled that 
the distribution of a signal by means of television sets by a hotel to customers 
staying in its rooms, whatever technique is used to transmit the signal, constitutes 
communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of [the Information 
Society] directive.46 
Th e Court stressed that ‘the need for uniform application of Community law and 
the principle of equality require that where provisions of Community law make no 
express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining 
their meaning and scope, as is the case with [the Information Society Directive], 
they must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation 
throughout the Community’. ‘It follows that the Austrian Government cannot 
reasonably maintain that it is for the Member States to provide the defi nition of 
“public” to which [the Information Society Directive] refers but does not defi ne’.47
Th e Court repeated that ‘in the context of this concept, the term “public” 
refers to an indeterminate number of potential television viewers’ and referred to 
its earlier Mediakabel and Lagardère decisions.48 It seems however that the Court 
realized that the criterion of an ‘indeterminate number of potential television 
viewers’, which was developed in the context of satellite broadcasting, would not 
necessarily apply to a limited number of customers in hotel rooms. Th erefore, the 
Court added: 
In a context such as that in the main proceedings, a general approach is required, 
making it necessary to take into account not only customers in hotel rooms, such 
customers alone being explicitly mentioned in the questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling, but also customers who are present in any other area of the hotel and able to 
make use of a television set installed there. It is also necessary to take into account 
the fact that, usually, hotel customers quickly succeed each other. As a general rule, 
a fairly large number of persons are involved, so that they may be considered to be a 
public, having regard to the principal objective of [the Information Society Directive] 
46 ECJ, 7 December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), operative part.
47 ECJ, 7 December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), paragraph 31.
48 ECJ, 7 December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), paragraph 37.
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[which is ‘to establish a high level of protection of, inter alios, authors, allowing 
them to obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works, in particular on the 
occasion of communication to the public’].49
Apparently, ‘a fairly large number of persons’ may also be considered to be a 
public.
In 2009 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled on the satellite 
transmission of encrypted signals containing television programmes to cable 
operators.50 Th e Supreme Court mentioned the Lagardère and Rafael Hoteles 
decisions by the European Court of Justice and ruled that such transmissions are 
not intended for reception by an indeterminate number of potential television 
viewers and are therefore not covered by the right of communication to the public 
nor by the openbaarmakingsrecht. Th e Supreme Court even concluded:
Openbaarmaking as meant in article 12 Auteurswet cannot apply to communications 
to (groups of) persons which do not belong to ‘the public’ as meant in the [Information 
Society Directive]. 
Th is statement probably is a bit too broad because some types of communication 
that are covered by the openbaarmakingsrecht, do not fall under Article 3 of the 
Information Society Directive, but under Article 4 of the same (distribution), and 
some are not harmonized at the European level at all (public performance).
In 2011 the European Court of Justice ruled in the Premier League case51 that 
the customers present in a public house constitute a public.
198 When […] authors authorise a broadcast of their works, they consider, in 
principle, only the owners of television sets who, either personally or within their 
own private or family circles, receive the signal and follow the broadcasts. Where a 
broadcast work is transmitted, in a place accessible to the public, for an additional 
public which is permitted by the owner of the television set to hear or see the work, 
an intentional intervention of that kind must be regarded as an act by which the work 
in question is communicated to a new public (see, to this eff ect, SGAE, paragraph 41, 
and Organismos Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Th eatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon 
Ergon, paragraph 37). 
49 ECJ, 7 December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), paragraph 38.
50 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 19 June 2009, LJN BH7602, NJ 2009, 290 (Buma v. Chellomedia)
51 CJEU, 4 October 2011, C-403/08 and C-429/08 (Premier League).
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199 Th at is so when the works broadcast are transmitted by the proprietor of a public 
house to the customers present in that establishment, because those customers 
constitute an additional public which was not considered by the authors when they 
authorised the broadcasting of their works.
Operative part, sub 7:
‘Communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of [the Information 
Society Directive] must be interpreted as covering transmission of the broadcast 
works, via a television screen and speakers, to the customers present in a public house.
In 2011 the European Court of Justice also ruled in its Airfi eld decision that 
several kinds of direct and indirect satellite transmissions ‘must be regarded 
as constituting a single communication to the public by satellite and thus as 
indivisible’ within the meaning of the Satellite and Cable Directive.
76  Nevertheless, that fi nding does not preclude intervention by other operators in 
the course of a communication such as that referred to in the preceding paragraph 
with the result that they render the protected subject-matter accessible to a public 
wider than that targeted by the broadcasting organisation concerned, that is to say, 
a public which was not taken into account by the authors of those works when they 
authorised the use of the latter by the broadcasting organisation. In such a situation, 
the intervention of those operators is thus not covered by the authorisation granted to 
the broadcasting organisation.52
Again, as in SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles and in Premier League, the fact that a ‘new 
public’ of viewers is reached, ‘that is to say, a public which was not taken into 
account by the authors of those works when they authorised the use of the latter 
by the broadcasting organisation’ gives rise to an obligation to ask for additional 
permission from the right holders.
Meanwhile, it is clear that the defi nition of ‘the public’ as ‘an indeterminate 
number of potential television viewers’, developed in Mediakabel and Lagardère, 
was meant for (satellite) broadcasting. As mentioned above, the defi nition is 
harder to apply to small-scale ‘rebroadcasting’ by cable to a limited number of 
people in a hotel, because the number of potential viewers might then not be 
‘indeterminate’. Th at is why the European Court of Justice added that ‘a fairly 
large number of persons’ may be considered to be a public.
52 CJEU, 13 October 2011, C-431/09 and C-432/09 9 (Airfi eld v. Sabam).
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It may be harder, rather impractical and/or undesirable to apply this criterion 
of ‘an indeterminate number of potential television viewers’ to making available, 
public performance and distribution. With public performance and making 
available to the public it will probably be inevitable to defi ne some kind of closed 
group or minimum audience within which a performance or an act of making 
available is not considered to be public. 
In respect to distribution the situation is even more complicated because of 
the concept of exhaustion.
Distribution to ‘the public’
Article 4(1) Information Society Directive explicitly contains a reference to ‘the 
public’. But Article 4(2) of the same directive states that the exhaustion eff ect 
takes place ‘where the fi rst sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community 
of that object is made by the right holder or with his consent’. It is clear that the 
fi rst sale itself is subject to the distribution right.53 More oft en than not however, 
the fi rst sale of an object does not take place to a member of the public, but to a 
trader or wholesaler or to a retailer. Th erefore, there can be no doubt that a sale or 
other transfer of ownership does not have to be eff ected to a member of the public 
to be covered by the distribution right of Article 4.
But what then does ‘to the public’ mean in Article 4 of the Information Society 
Directive?
In paragraph 31 of the Peek & Cloppenburg v. Cassina decision, the European 
Court of Justice stressed that the concept of distribution in Article 4(1) of that 
directive must be interpreted, as far as is possible, in the light of the defi nitions 
given in the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performers and Phonograms 
Treaty.
Th e relevant defi nition is given in Article 6(1) of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty: ‘Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their 
works through sale or other transfer of ownership’. It is remarkable that Article 
6(1) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty speaks of ‘making available to the public’, a 
phrase now usually reserved for making available online. 
Th e Court of Appeal of Th e Hague in a decision in 201154 suggested that this 
terminology probably is a remnant of the initial idea in the draft ing process of 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty that Article 6 on distribution would also include 
making available online: the making available to the public of their works in 
53 ECJ, 17 April 2008, C-456/06 (Peek & Cloppenburg v. Cassina).
54 Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, 31 May 2011, LJN BQ6773, IEF 9740 (Hauck v. Stokke).
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such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them. In the end it was decided at the 1996 WIPO 
Conference that this kind of making available would be covered by the right of 
communication to the public in Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and 
not by Article 6 of the same. Th is follows clearly from the Agreed Statements 
concerning Articles 6 and 7: 
As used in these Articles, the expressions ‘copies’ and ‘original and copies,’ being 
subject to the right of distribution and the right of rental under the said Articles, refer 
exclusively to fi xed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects.
Th e Court of Appeal of Th e Hague argued that this was the only reason why 
Article 6 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 4 of the Information Society 
Directive contain a reference to ‘the public’ at all. Th e court went on to argue that 
in fact this reference to ‘the public’ only means that the objects in question must 
be meant to be distributed eventually to end users. Th e court thereby contradicted 
its own earlier statement in the same decision that ‘the public’ in Article 4 of the 
Information Society Directive must mean the same as ‘the public’ in Article 3(1) 
of the Directive. 
But it seems clear that there must be a diff erent meaning. In Article 3, at least 
as far as broadcasting is concerned, there must be a signal (containing protected 
works) that is aimed directly at ‘an indeterminate number of potential television 
viewers’. Th e preceding transmissions to intermediaries such as cable operators 
are not relevant under copyright. It is only the end of the chain of communication 
that is actually directed at the end user which is relevant under the right of 
communication to the public. In respect to the distribution right it is exactly the 
opposite: it usually is the beginning of the chain of communication to the end 
user that is relevant. In Article 4 the distribution right also covers, and in fact 
mainly covers the fi rst sale to any person or entity, which is usually not a member 
of the public but an intermediary. Th e actual sale to a member of the public is 
only aff ected by the distribution right if there has not been a preceding fi rst sale 
by or with the consent of the right owner.
Another reason why the distribution right should not be limited to distribution 
to an end user/member of the public is that the industrial property rights 
regarding patents, trademarks and designs do not have that limitation either. It 
would be very impractical if the exhaustion rules for copyright and neighbouring 
rights were to diff er from those in patent law, trademark law and design law.
251
Openbaar maken: Communication to the public
4.3 Rental and lending right
No rental or lending right existed in the Netherlands before the implementation 
of the EU Rental Right Directive in 1995. In the Stemra v. Free Record Shop 
decision of 1987, the Supreme Court had confi rmed that no rental right existed. 
Obviously, most aspects of the rental and lending right are governed by the Rental 
Right Directive. Th e rental and lending rights are defi ned in Article 12(1)(3), 12(2) 
and 12(3) DCA.
Rental […] means making available for use for a limited period of time for direct or 
indirect economic or commercial advantage. (Article 12(2) DCA)
Lending […] means making available for use by establishments which are accessible 
to the public, for a limited period of time and not for direct or indirect economic or 
commercial advantage. (Article 12(3) DCA)
Th e rental and lending rights do not apply to works of architecture and works of 
applied art.55
Th e rental right is an exclusive right which can be exercised as such. Th e 
lending right is transformed by Article 15c into a right to remuneration on the 
basis of Article 6 of the Rental Right Directive. It should be noted that in the 
Dutch Copyright Act the words ‘billijke vergoeding’ are used to describe both 
‘equitable remuneration’ and ‘fair compensation’, which have diff erent meanings 
in the European directives. Moreover, it should be noted that Article 6 of the 
Rental Right Directive only prescribes ‘remuneration’, whereas in the Dutch 
implementation the word ‘billijk’, meaning ‘fair’ or ‘equitable’, is added. In Article 
5 of the Rental Right Directive an ‘equitable remuneration’ is prescribed, which is 
also implemented as ‘billijke vergoeding’.
If the author assigns the producer his rental right in respect of a work fi xed on 
a phonogram or of a fi lm work, the author retains the right to fair compensation 
(or actually ‘equitable remuneration’ as prescribed by Article 5 of the Rental Right 
Directive) for the rental, which may not be waved.56 In the Netherlands the right 
to an equitable remuneration for the rental is not exercised through a collecting 
society, and in practice no separate payment of an equitable remuneration takes 
place. Th e equitable remuneration for rental is usually deemed to be included in 
the lump sum payment to the author.
55 Article 12(1)3.




‘Provided the person doing or causing the lending pays a fair compensation, it is 
not regarded as an infringement of the copyright, to lend […] the whole or part of 
the work or a copy which has been put into circulation by or with the consent of 
the right-holder’. (Article 15c(1) Dutch Copyright Act). 
Th e remuneration for lending has to be paid to a collecting society, a foundation 
called ‘Stichting Leenrecht’ (Lending Right Foundation) which is designated 
by the government.57 Th e remuneration is paid (mainly) by public libraries. 
Educational establishments and research institutes, the libraries attached to them, 
and the ‘Koninklijke Bibliotheek’ (National Library) are exempt from payment of 
a lending remuneration.58
Th e level of the remuneration for lending is set by another foundation designated 
by the government, called ‘Stichting Onderhandelingen Leenvergoedingen’ 
(StOL – Foundation Negotiations Lending Remunerations), in which the right 
holders and public libraries are represented evenly and which is presided over 
by an independent president.59 Th e District Court of Th e Hague has exclusive 
jurisdiction over any disputes concerning the remuneration for lending.60
Th e public lending right does not apply to computer programs, unless the 
computer program ‘is part of a data carrier that contains data and [the computer 
program] serves exclusively to make said data accessible’.61
Th e lending of computer programs as such, including business soft ware and 
all other kinds of operational soft ware without an information component, is 
therefore not permitted under the public lending scheme. However, the lending of 
multimedia products such as CD-ROMs is permitted, ‘insofar as the interactive 
or game element in the soft ware is subsidiary to the relevant information’.62 
Whether or not the lending right does apply has to be established on a case 
by case basis. Public libraries and right holders agreed to a practical solution 
whereby multimedia products with a so-called PEGI (Pan-European Game 
Information) code are not covered by the lending rights and cannot be lent out 
without permission of the right holder, whereas multimedia products without 
such a code are covered and can be lent out, unless the right holder expressly 
forbids the lending.
Th e renewal of the lending term for the same product to the same user does 




61 Article 15c(1), last sentence.
62 District Court Amsterdam, 18 December 2002, AMI 2003, nr 10, p. 99 (lending of CD-ROMs).
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not amount to a new openbaarmaking and therefore does not give rise to the 
payment of an additional remuneration for lending.63
4.4 Satellite broadcasting 
‘Th e broadcasting by satellite of a work incorporated in a radio or television 
programme means: the act of introducing, under the control and responsibility 
of the broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals intended for 
reception by the public into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading 
to the satellite and down towards the earth. Where the programme-carrying 
signals are encrypted, there is broadcasting by satellite of a work incorporated in 
a radio or television programme on condition that the means for decrypting the 
broadcast are provided to the public by or with the consent of the broadcasting 
organization’ (Article 12(7) DCA).
Article 12(7) contains the implementation of Article 1(2) and Article 2 of 
the Satellite and Cable Directive. Article 47b contains the rule that the Dutch 
Copyright Act only applies to the ‘up-link’ mentioned in Article 12(7), if this up-
link takes place in the Netherlands.
Before this directive, satellite broadcasting was also considered to be covered 
by the openbaarmakingsrecht, but was not the subject of any Dutch specifi c debate 
or litigation. Th e transmission by satellite of background music to professional 
users of such background music was also considered an openbaarmaking.64
In Lagardère the European Court of Justice decided that where a fi rst 
transmission is not directed at the public, but at a terrestrial transmitter in 
another country, which in turn broadcasts to the public in the fi rst country, the 
fi rst transmission is not a communication to the public. Th e broadcast by the 
transmitter in the second country does amount to a communication to the public: 
In the case of a broadcast of the kind at issue in this case, [the Satellite and Cable 
Directive] does not preclude the fee for phonogram use being governed not only by the 
law of the Member State in whose territory the broadcasting company is established 
but also by the legislation of the Member State in which, for technical reasons, the 
terrestrial transmitter broadcasting to the fi rst State is located.65
63 Court of Appeal Th e Hague, 28 June 2011, LJN BR 2527 (Public Libraries v. Stichting Leenrecht), appeal 
to the Supreme Court pending.
64 District Court Arnhem, 8 March 2001, AMI 2001 (Buma v. Digi Music).
65 ECJ, 14 July 2055, C-192/04 (Lagardère), paragraph 30. 
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As mentioned above, the European Court of Justice ruled in its Airfi eld decision 
that several kinds of direct and indirect satellite transmissions ‘must be regarded as 
constituting a single communication to the public by satellite and thus as indivisible’ 
within the meaning of the Satellite and Cable Directive, but that nevertheless 
additional permission was needed in this case because the protected subject matter 
had been made accessible to a public wider than that targeted by the broadcasting 
organization concerned, that is to say, a public which was not taken into account 
by the authors of those works when they authorized the use of the latter by the 
broadcasting organization. ‘In such a situation, the intervention of those operators 
is thus not covered by the authorisation granted to the broadcasting organisation’.
Apparently, the eff ect of the Information Society Directive is such that the 
Satellite and Cable Directive is to a large extent replaced by this directive, insofar 
as its eff ect on the communication to the public right is concerned.
4.5 Public exhibition
It follows from the European Court of Justice’s decision in the Peek & Cloppenburg 
v. Cassina case that exhibiting furniture protected by copyright is not covered by 
the distribution right:66
Th e concept of distribution to the public, otherwise than through sale, of the original 
of a work or a copy thereof, for the purpose of Article 4(1) of [the Information Society 
Directive], applies only where there is a transfer of the ownership of that object. 
As a result, neither granting to the public the right to use reproductions of a work 
protected by copyright nor exhibiting to the public those reproductions without 
actually granting a right to use them can constitute such a form of distribution.
It follows from the wording of Article 12(4) (‘Th e same applies to exhibitions’) 
that the openbaarmakingsrecht in the Dutch Copyright Act also covers public 
exhibition. Th is exhibition right is however severely limited by Article 23, which 
stipulates that ‘[u]nless otherwise agreed, whoever owns, possesses or holds a 
work of dra wing, painting, sculpture or architecture, or a work of applied art, 
is permitted to reproduce and make public that work so far as necessary for the 
public exhibition or public sale of that work, all subject to the exclusion of any 
other commercial use.’ 
Th erefore, the public exhibition right only applies to works owned by the 
author and the fi rst sale ‘exhausts’ the exhibition right.
66 ECJ, 17 April 2008, C-456/06 (Peek & Cloppenburg v. Cassina).
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Making available for viewing on site by an individual
Consensus exists on the premise that the openbaarmakingsrecht does not apply 
to the making available for on-site reference use in libraries of books and journals. 
However, the showing of an audiovisual work in a video cabin for individual 
viewing in a sex shop was considered an openbaarmaking.67
4.6 Making available online
Before the Information Society Directive and the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 
1996, it was already clear that making available on the Internet was covered by 
the openbaarmakingsrecht.68 Th e Dutch legislator did not consider it necessary 
to implement the so-called making available right mentioned in the Information 
Society Directive (the right relating to the making available to the public of 
works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them), because there was no doubt that this 
activity was already covered by the existing openbaarmakingsrecht. Uploading 
content and the making available of one’s own website certainly is covered by the 
openbaarmakingsrecht. In practice, enforcement of copyright against anonymous 
individual uploaders or website owners has proved very hard, if not impossible. 
Th erefore, the focus has shift ed to enforcement against all kinds of professional 
intermediaries on the Internet.
Telecom operators that only provide the cables and/or access to the Internet 
and Internet Service Providers that host thousands of websites are not considered 
to be liable for any direct copyright infringement through openbaarmaking in 
the Netherlands.69 
Applicable global and European treaty and directive provisions
Th e openbaarmakingsrecht relating to making available online is not only 
infl uenced and harmonized by Article 3 of the Information Society Directive. As 
mentioned above, this Article 3 is an implementation of Article 8 of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty. And although it only entered into force on 14 March 2010, the 
‘agreed statement’ concerning Article 8 has been an important point of reference 
for quite some time: 
67 Court of Appeal Th e Hague, 1 December 1994, AMI 1995, p. 51 (Güfa v. Sexshoppy Dinges).
68 District Court of Rotterdam, 24 August 1995, AMI 1996, p. 101 (Eindeloos Bridge).
69 District Court of Th e Hague, 9 June 1999, AMI 1999-7, p. 113 (Scientology v. XS4ALL). 
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It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making 
a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of 
this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that nothing in Article 
8 precludes a Contracting Party from applying Article 11bis (2).
Th e Dutch courts have referred to this statement in cases related to the involvement 
of all kinds of professional intermediaries in making available online. Th e 
Information Society Directive however also contains an important provision 
regarding the position of Internet intermediaries in Article 8(3): 
Member States shall ensure that right holders are in a position to apply for an 
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe 
a copyright or related right.
Th is provision is repeated in Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive:
[…] Member States shall also ensure that right holders are in a position to apply for an 
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe 
an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/
EC.
But there are also the provisions in the e-Commerce Directive which limit the 
liability of Internet intermediaries. Articles 12 to 15 exclude from liability mere 
conduit, caching and hosting and prohibit the imposition of a ‘general obligation’ 
on Internet intermediaries ‘to monitor the information which they transmit or 
store’ and of ‘a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating 
illegal activity’. Th ose provisions, however, do ‘not aff ect the possibility for a court 
or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States’ legal systems, of 
requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement’.70
Hyperlinking and embedding
Mere hyperlinking is generally believed not to amount to an openbaarmaking.71 
But many distinctions can be made between diff erent kinds of hyperlinking. 
A fi rst distinction is whether or not hyperlinking takes place to sources on the 
Internet which are made available to the public by or with permission of the right 
holder (hereinaft er: ‘a legal source’ as opposed to an ‘illegal source’). Another 
70 Articles 12(3), 13(2), 14(3) of the eCommerce Directive.
71 See for instance: District Court of Th e Hague 2 November 2011, LJN BU3223 (Real Networks v. X).
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distinction is whether the Internet user can see that the hyperlink links to 
another source on the Internet, for instance by the opening of a new window or 
the appearance of another URL (hereinaft er: ‘a clear hyperlink’ as opposed to a 
‘cloaked’, ‘framed’ or ‘embedded’ hyperlink).
It is generally accepted that clear hyperlinking, including deep linking to a 
legal source does not amount to an openbaarmaking.72 Hyperlinking to an illegal 
source is usually also not considered to amount to an openbaarmaking, but can 
be an ‘unfair act’ under general tort law if done knowingly or intentionally. Th e 
status of embedded hyperlinks to legal or illegal sources is (also) less clear. A 
framed hyperlink is sometimes considered to be a communication to the public, 
and so is an embedded hyperlink.73
Peer-to-peer fi le sharing 
Th ere is no doubt that peer-to-peer fi le sharing is covered by the openbaar-
makingsrecht.74 Th e countless, usually anonymous fi le sharers (‘peers’), which 
make the music and fi lm on their computers available for others to copy (‘share’), 
certainly do make it available to the public. But enforcement against all those 
anonymous individual peers is practically impossible, if not undesirable. 
Th erefore the question is what kind of enforcement is possible and against whom.
Th e most far-reaching solution would be legal action against the makers of 
the peer-to-peer soft ware itself. In the Buma v. KaZaA case, the district court in 
Amsterdam ruled that the making available of peer-to-peer soft ware by KaZaA, in 
its heyday the most popular peer-to-peer provider in the world, attracting between 
four and fi ve million daily users in 2001,75 amounted to an openbaarmaking, a 
direct copyright infringement, of all material being exchanged with the use of 
this soft ware. Th e Court of Appeal of Amsterdam reversed this decision and ruled 
that the peer-to-peer soft ware also had substantial non-infringing uses and could 
for instance be used for exchanging recipes and jokes. Th erefore the court ruled 
that there was no openbaarmaking (direct copyright infringement) and that the 
makers of the soft ware did not act unlawfully either (on the basis of tort law). Th e 
Dutch Supreme Court confi rmed this decision, mainly because the demand by 
plaintiff  for KaZaA to recall its soft ware or apply some kind of fi ltering was not 
72 Court of Appeal Arnhem, 4 July 2006, IEF 2288 (Zoekallehuizen.nl).
73 See for instance: Court of Appeal Den Bosch, 12 January 2010, IEF 8514 (C More v. MyP2P), Cantonal 
Court Haarlem, 5 September 2007, LJN BB 3144 and Cantonal Court Rotterdam, 2 September 2004, 
AMI 2005, p. 69 (Schlijper v. Nieuw Rechts) and President of the District Court Leeuwarden, 30 October 
2003, AMI 2004, p. 32 (Vriend v. Batavus).
74 P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘Napster: een Bliksemonderzoek’, Computerrecht 2000/5, p. 228.




feasible, and also confi rmed that there is no concept of contributory copyright 
infringement in Dutch law. Th e decision of the Dutch courts in this case must 
not be misunderstood as meaning that peer-to-peer fi le sharing as such does not 
infringe copyright law or that there is not a possibility of taking action against 
facilitating it on the basis of civil law liability on the grounds of an ‘unlawful act’ 
(tort).
Apart from soft ware, fi le-sharing peers need to be able to fi nd each other 
and the material they want to share. With peer-to-peer fi le sharing there is no 
central database where the fi les are stored, but usually there are central indexing 
services. Information on what material can be obtained where gets uploaded 
by individual users or collected through search engines. Th ese indexing sites 
usually are almost entirely dedicated to copyright infringing material from 
the start, or become dedicated to this quickly. Th e courts in the Netherlands 
have been rejecting claims that heavy involvement in the making available of 
infringing material on the Internet amounts to a direct copyright infringement 
on the basis of openbaarmakingsrecht. It seems that only the actual ‘physical’ 
act of uploading fi les or making fi les available on one’s own computer would fall 
under the openbaarmakingsrecht according to the Dutch courts. Th e structural 
and systematic facilitating of copyright infringements through communication 
to the public over the Internet either through peer-to-peer fi le sharing or other 
Internet facilities, by indexing sites, so-called Torrent-hosts and dedicated search 
engines, has however been considered to amount to an ‘unlawful act’ in all of the 
considerable number of cases brought to the courts, most of them brought by the 
Dutch anti-piracy organization BREIN.76
In early 2012, a Dutch court held that a hosting provider was obliged to 
block access for its subscribers to the peer-to-peer site Th e Pirate Bay situated in 
Sweden, on the basis of Article 26d DCA which is in turn based on Article 11 of 
the Enforcement Directive.77 
76 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 15 June 2006, LJN AX7579 (Techno Design v. BREIN); President of the 
District Court of Th e Hague, 5 January 2007, AMI 2007/2, nr. 9, LJN AX5678 (BREIN v. KPN); President 
of the District Court of Amsterdam, 21 June 2007, LJN BA7810 (BREIN v. Leaseweb I); Court of Appeal 
of Amsterdam, 3 July 2008, LJN BD6223 (BREIN v. Leaseweb II); President of the District Court of 
’s-Hertogenbosch, 8 July 2008, B9 6425 (BREIN v. Euroacces); District Court of Utrecht, 26 August 2009, 
LJN BJ6008, IEF 8127 (BREIN v. Mininova); President of the District Court of Amsterdam, 22 October 
2009, B9 8287 (BREIN v. Th e Pirate Bay); Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch, 12 January 2010, B9 8514 
(C More Entertainment v. Myp2p); Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 16 March 2010, B9 8678 (BREIN v. 
Shareconnector); Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, 15 November 2010, LJN BO398 (FTD v. Eyeworks); 
District Court of Haarlem, 9 February 2011, LJN BP3757 (BREIN v. FTD); President of the District Court 
of Th e Hague, 22 March 2011, IEF 9487 (KNVB v. MyP2P); 
77 District Court of Th e Hague, 11 January 2012, LJN BV0549, IEF 10763 (BREIN v. Ziggo and XS4All).
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5. Assessment and future developments
It has become clear that, according to the European Court of Justice, the 
concepts of communication to the public and distribution in Articles 3 and 4 
of the Information Society Directive amount to an almost complete European 
harmonization of all possible modes of exploitation of copyrighted works.
For the time being, only live performance and public exhibition seem to 
be excluded from harmonization. Th ese are however modes of exploitation of 
modest importance.
Th e European Court of Justice has reintroduced the criterion of ‘new public’, 
being a public not taken into account in an earlier permission. Th e ‘intervention 
by other operators in the course of a communication’, mentioned in paragraph 
76 of the Airfi eld decision,78 reminds us of the ‘autre organisme’ in the Berne 
Convention. But it might have an even broader application. It will have to be seen 
how the European Court of Justice will apply this criterion to several diff erent 
modes of exploitation, especially over the Internet. It is inevitable that many more 
questions on the reach of the concept of communication to the public will be put 
before the European Court of Justice in the near future.79
6. Conclusion
Th e Dutch concept of openbaar maken has proven in the past to be suffi  ciently 
broad to cover most new technological developments. It seems that the European 
concepts of ‘communication to the public’ and ‘distribution’ can turn out to be 
equally broad or even broader. 
Applying the concept of openbaar maken to the diff erent actors in recent 
technologies such as hyperlinking, embedding, search engines and peer-to-
peer systems has proven more diffi  cult. Th e courts in the Netherlands have 
oft en resorted to applying the national general civil law concept of ‘unfair act’ to 
acts which might or might not in fact be communications to the public. Th is is 
unfortunate as far European harmonization is concerned.
78 CJEU, 13 October 2011, C-431/09 and C-432/09 9 (Airfi eld v. Sabam).
79 See f.i. the preliminary reference in the ITV/TVCatchup case (C-607/11).

